

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMCONSUL MUNICH

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USDELMBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 3061

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG

SUBJ: CSCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SOVIET POLICY

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REF: MOSCOW 5822

1. SUMMARY: WE WERE MOST INTERESTED TO READ EMBASSY MOSCOW'S ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY AFTER CSCE, AND IN THIS TELEGRAM WE COMMENT ON CERTAIN SUBJECTS IT RAISED. IN GENERAL, WE AGREE THAT IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO CONCLUDE CSCE THIS SUMMER. WE ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMPLEX ISSUES WHICH MUST STILL BE RESOLVED WILL MAKE THIS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE UNLESS THE SOVIETS DEMONSTRATE A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN UP TO NOW. THE SHEER COMPLEXITY OF THE INTER-RELATED CSCE ISSUES, AND OF FINDING SOLUTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL 35 PARTICIPATING STATES, MAY MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO CONCLUDE STAGE II IN TIME FOR A STAGE III IN JULY. THIS PROBLEM RAISES THE QUESTION OF HOW THE US SHOULD REACT TO THIS SITUATION, AND OUR INCLINATION IS TO MAKE THE SOVIETS WORK FOR THE TIMING THEY OBVIOUSLY NEED. THIS TELEGRAM ALSO CALLS ATTENTION TO CSCE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AS AN ASPECT OF MILITARY DETENTE, AND CONSIDERS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TOUGH SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NEGOTIATION OF EVERY NUANCE IN BASKET III TEXTS. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBASSY MOSCOW'S PERCEPTIVE AND TIMELY ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY AFTER THE CSCE HAS BEEN READ WITH GREAT INTEREST BY THOSE OF US WHO LABOR IN THE VINEYARDS AT STAGE II OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE AGREE WITH THE GENERAL THRUST OF THIS ANALYSIS, WHICH GOES WELL BEYOND THE LIMITED PERSPECTIVE WHICH IS POSSIBLE TO US IN GENEVA. THE THOUGHTS WE MENTION BELOW SHOULD BE SEEN AS FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS ON POINTS WHICH ARE OF CURRENT INTEREST FROM THE ANGLE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES.

3. TIMING -- WITH REGARD TO THE TIMING OF THE THIRD STAGE OF CSCE THE KREMLIN IS NO DOUBT DISAPPOINTED THAT IT COULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN TIME FOR THE CELEBRATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE, AND IT IS OBVIOUSLY IN OUR INTEREST TO ENSURE THAT BREZHNEV CONTINUES TO BE INTERESTED IN AN EARLY AND SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE IRONIC THING ABOUT TIMING IS THAT THE EAST HAS STALLED ON SO MANY ISSUES THAT IT HAS SQUEEZED ITSELF INTO A VERY SHORT TIMEFRAME
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IN THE HOPE OF ELIMINATING MANY UNPLEASANT IDEAS IN THE FINAL NEGOTIATING CRUNCH, BUT THIS APPROACH MAY RESULT IN A POSTPONEMENT OF STAGE III IF THE SOVIETS DO NOT COME UP VERY SOON WITH A REASONABLE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY. THE JUNE 30 DATE THE SOVIET HAVE SELECTED FOR STAGE III IS FAST BECOMING A MIRAGE, AND IT IS NOW QUESTIONABLE WHETHER STAGE III CAN TAKE PLACE BEFORE LATE JULY, IF THEN. THIS TIME FACTOR HAS CAUSED AN

UNUSUAL DEGREE OF NERVOUSNESS AND UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE SOVIET DELEGATION WHICH IS PRESENTLY ENGAGING IN CLUMSY (AND HOPEFULLY FRUITLESS) EFFORTS TO DIVIDE THE WEST.

4. EMBASSY MOSCOW HAS SPECULATED ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF A DELAYED CONCLUSION, PRESUMABLY UNTIL THE FALL, OR EVEN THE COLLAPSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE LATTER EVENTUALITY IS NEVER MENTIONED AMONG DELEGATIONS HERE AND, BARRING SOME EXTREME DEVELOPMENT, IT SEEMS INCONCEIVABLE TO US THAT STAGE II COULD BE ABORTED. NO DOUBT THERE ARE SOME POLITICIANS, SUCH AS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN THE WEST GERMAN CDU, WHO WOULD WELCOME AN UNCONSCIONABLY LONG "PAUSE" IN THE PROCEEDINGS TO BETTER STUDY ALL POSSIBLE POLITICAL EFFECTS. ALSO CERTAIN JOURNALISTS SEEM BENT ON INTRODUCING MORE AND MORE SKEPTICISM INTO THEIR STORIES ABOUT WHAT THE WEST STANDS TO GAIN. BUT THESE VOICES HAVE NOT HAD A CONSPICUOUS EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES - AT LEAST NOT YET.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND A DELAYED CONCLUSION FORCING THE SUMMIT INTO THE FALL IS A LIVELY POSSIBILITY. GIVEN THE BEST OF WILL BY ALL CONCERNED THE SHEER VOLUME OF WORK STILL TO BE ACCOMPLISHED COULD PREVENT OUR COMPLETING OUR TASKS BEFORE THE SACRED AUGUST VACATION PERIOD. EACH TIME WE FIND SOLUTIONS THAT APPEAR TO SHORTEN THE WORK SCHEDULE NEW PROBLEMS CROP UP WHICH REVEAL SHARP DIVISIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE LATTER GOES BY THE INNOCUOUS NAME OF "STRUCTURE AND FORM OF FINAL DOCUMENTS". THE SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED TO SET BASKET I APART, PRESUMABLY SO THAT THEY CAN, IF NEED BE, SHOVE BASKETS II AND III UNDER THE RUG LATER ON AND PROPAGANDIZE ONLY THE EUPHORIA - PRODUCING "SECURITY"

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ASPECTS OF THE CONFERENCE. THE WEST IS ALERT TO THESE POSSIBILITIES AND IS DETERMINED TO PREVENT THEM FROM HAPPENING. SEVERAL WEEKS OF WRANGLING HAVE FAILED TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS. IMPORTANT OLDER ISSUES SUCH AS THE "PEACEFUL CHANGE" LANGUAGE OR THE PARAGRAPH ON QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES STILL FACE DETERMINED OPPOSITION. EVEN WHEN THE SOVIETS AND THE NATO COUNTRIES CAN AGREE, AS WE DO ON THE TWO EXAMPLES JUST MENTIONED, ONE OR TWO NEUTRALS OR THE ROMANIANS WILL THREATEN TO BLOCK CONSENSUS UNLESS A CHANGE IS MADE WHICH WOULD UPSET DELICATELY BALANCED PHRASEOLOGY. OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS CYPRUS AND SOME MINTOFF SCHEME REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES IN STAGE III OR FOLLOW-UP COULD PRODUCE UNEXPECTED DELAYS. IN ANY EVENT FROM WHERE WE SIT A SUMMIT IN

JULY APPEARS MORE AND MORE PROBLEMATICAL.

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INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07

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6. THIS SITUATION RAISES THE VERY REAL QUESTION OF
HOW THE US AND THE WEST IN GENERAL SHOULD TILT IN THE
FINAL WEEKS OF NEGOTIATION: TOWARD THE BEST POSSIBLE

RESULTS, OR TOWARD THE MOST DESIRABLE TIMEFRAME. SINCE
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THE SOVIETS CLEARLY WANT AN EARLY CONCLUSION, THERE IS
SOME INCLINATION HERE TO LET THEM PAY FOR IT WITH SOME
REASONABLE CONCESSIONS ON SUBSTANCE, WHILE NOT DISCOURAGING
THEM TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THEY WILL GIVE UP TRYING.

7. CBMS -- EMBASSY MOSCOW DID NOT MENTION CSCE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH MILITARY DETENTE, AND DID NOT EXPRESS ANY VIEW AS TO WHETHER AND HOW THE SOVIETS WILL CARRY THEM OUT. GRANTED PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS AND THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS ARE BABY STEPS IN RELATION TO MBFR AND SALT; BUT THESE MINOR ADVANCES IN THE MILITARY SPHERE ARE CAUSING THE SOVIETS CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME. THEY REJECTED MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS FOR MONTHS AND ARE NOW TRYING TO RAM THROUGH THE "VOLUNTARY BASIS" FOR NOTIFICATION IN EXCHANGE FOR VAGUE PROMISES OF MORE REALISTIC PARAMETERS. THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE SIMILAR BARGAINS IN THE PAST AND THEIR FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT SOME OF THEM HAS GIVEN RISE TO CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM AT THE CONFERENCE. HERE AGAIN THE ROMANIANS HAVE TAKEN A FIRM POSITION AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND CLAIM THEY WILL INSIST ON A MORE BINDING NATURE OF ANY NOTIFICATION COMMITMENT. AS ON SEVERAL OTHER ISSUES THE ROMANIANS HERE ATTRIBUTE THIS POSITION TO CEAUSESCU PERSONALLY. DESPITE THEIR INSISTENCE ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE FACT THAT APPROVAL AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, PLUS REASONABLY DETAILED PARAMETERS, PROVIDES AMPLE ASSURANCE OF THEIR POLITICAL INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT CBM AGREEMENTS. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT THEY WILL.

8. BASKET III -- WE WOULD AGREE WITH EMBASSY MOSCOW THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THE SOVIETS WILL IMPLEMENT BASKET III IN A LITERAL SENSE, AND THAT IN ANY CASE THERE WILL BE NO WAY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BE VERY STUBBORN ABOUT EVEN MINOR ISSUES IN THIS SUBJECT AREA, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THIS STUBBORNNESS RUNS THE RISK OF DELAYING A CONCLUSION TO THE CONFERENCE. THEIR TOUGHNESS CLEARLY REFLECTS DEEP ROOTED SOVIET FEARS THAT BASKET III TEXTS WILL NOT ONLY BE CITED AGAINST THEM FROM ABROAD, BUT WILL
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ALSO SERVE SOVIET DISSIDENT GROUPS AS A NEW LONG-TERM RALLYING POINT. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE WE WOULD NOT BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC, WE BELIEVE IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT SOVIET TOUGHNESS OVER EVERY NUANCE MAY ALSO INDICATE A GREATER FEELING OF OBLIGATION TO OBSERVE BASKET III COMMITMENTS THAN IS USUALLY SUPPOSED.

9. FOLLOW-UP -- WE AGREE WITH EMBASSY MOSCOW THAT THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE LOST SOME OF THEIR INTEREST IN SEEKING TO HAVE CSCE SET UP A FORMAL CONSULTATIVE FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO MAKE A FINAL JUDGEMENT ON THIS POINT. IN ANY CASE, WE DO NOT THINK THE SOVIETS HAVE ALTERED THEIR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF MOVING TOWARD AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM, AND CERTAINLY THEY SEE CSCE AS LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR SUCH A SYSTEM. IF THEY HAVE INDEED REDUCED THEIR SHORT-TERM AMBITIONS IT IS BECAUSE OF A COMBINATION OF FACTORS: EMBARRASSMENT BY SOME ISSUES RAISED IN CSCE; REALIZATION THAT THE GROUND IS NOT YET REALLY FERTILE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FULL-SCALE FOLLOW-UP; AND RECOGNITION THAT, IN ANY CASE, THE NEUTRALS AND OTHER SMALLER EUROPEAN STATES WILL ENSURE THAT SOME FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITY IS ESTABLISHED BY CSCE. AT THIS POINT THE SOVIETS SEEM MOST INTERESTED IN OBTAINING A GENERAL COMMITMENT TO FURTHER EUROPEAN CONFERENCES IN THE FUTURE THAN IN WORKING HARD FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ELABORATE FOLLOW-UP STRUCTURE AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH WE ASSUME THEY WILL SEIZE FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION.

10. WE SUBMIT THESE REFLECTIONS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO REFTEL, AND WILL BE INTERESTED IN READING ANY FURTHER COMMENT WHICH EMBASSY MOSCOW OR OTHER INTERESTED POSTS MAY MAKE ON THIS SUBJECT.
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